Gary Childress wrote:
I agree that all the evidence seems to suggest the mind supervenes upon the brain. It seems like one cannot possibly have a mind without a brain. .
Your first sentence seems to imply a dualism; your second a mind-brain unity.
Surely if you can't have a mind without a brain, you are not suggesting a "supervening" mind, but a fully embodied one.
The "mind" is what the brain does; not a connected but separate entity?
Thank you for a very thoughtful reply, Hobbes.
In philosophy, supervenience is an ontological relation that is used to describe cases where (roughly speaking) the upper-level properties [in this case "mind"] of a system are determined by its lower level properties [in this case "brain"].
Is it radically different to say that "the mind supervenes upon brain" and that "there cannot be mind without brain"? In other words if I say "mind supervenes upon brain", am I excluding the possibility that there cannot be mind without brain?
In the philosophy of mind, dualism is the theory that the mental and the physical—or mind and body or mind and brain—are, in some sense, radically different kinds of thing.
Working on the definition above it seems to me that a person can be a "dualist" and still believe that mind cannot be present without a brain. Or perhaps it would be more accurate to say that the mental cannot be present without some sort of physical system to bring it into being. In philosophy of mind, the opposite of a "dualist" is typically considered to be a "monist", someone who believes either that everything is mental or that everything is physical.
Can there be a brain (of particular and peculiar structure and complexity) and no mind?
Probably not. Seems to me, if you have matter of a certain composition and mass, and that matter is arranged in such a way, you get mind or self or I without even trying (very hard).
The proof is in in the pudding: the only folks who are mindless/selfless/I-less are those with some profound deficit or damage (in the composition or structure of the brain). Normal, healthy brains (in bodies, in the world) do 'mind'.
As to the philosophical zombie: if it exists how the hell can we ever know? What test can we apply to separate the wheat from chaff? If the difference is physical, then the philo-zombie is just a victim of damage or deviation. If there is no physical difference between the I and the zombie (therefore no way to measure or test for difference) then, again, how can we ever know?
You got Joe...he's been married to Jan for fifty, mostly happy, years...Jan is a philo-zombie, a perfect emulator of 'I' but not actually an 'I'.
Present this fact to Joe and he'll tell you you're fucked in the head...he knows her intimately...she's a person, he sez.
Putting aside the plot hole of how you know Jan is just bio-automation, if there's no way to measure or test for Jan's zombiehood, how do you convince Joe? And, even if she is I-less, does it matter?
henry quirk wrote:Can there be a brain (of particular and peculiar structure and complexity) and no mind?
Probably not. Seems to me, if you have matter of a certain composition and mass, and that matter is arranged in such a way, you get mind or self or I without even trying (very hard).
The proof is in in the pudding: the only folks who are mindless/selfless/I-less are those with some profound deficit or damage (in the composition or structure of the brain). Normal, healthy brains (in bodies, in the world) do 'mind'.
As to the philosophical zombie: if it exists how the hell can we ever know? What test can we apply to separate the wheat from chaff? If the difference is physical, then the philo-zombie is just a victim of damage or deviation. If there is no physical difference between the I and the zombie (therefore no way to measure or test for difference) then, again, how can we ever know?
I agree. There seems to be no way to discern through scientific methods whether something is a "philosophical zombie" or a conscious being.
It certainly seems like it would be the case that wherever there is a reasonably functional human brain, there must also by necessity be "consciousness" or "mind". Suppose it ever became technologically possible for scientists in the distant future to meticulously both map the atomic structure of a human brain and manipulate individual atoms in such a way as to compose complex macro-molecular structures? Suppose it became possible to meticulously create a fully functional "replica" of a human brain from scratch and place it in a physical container that would sustain biochemical activity in it? I wonder if that brain would be a conscious person? It sort of seems prima facie that such a brain would be "conscious" or possess a "mind", provided it is structurally identical to other human brains.
Gary Childress wrote:
I agree that all the evidence seems to suggest the mind supervenes upon the brain. It seems like one cannot possibly have a mind without a brain. .
Your first sentence seems to imply a dualism; your second a mind-brain unity.
Surely if you can't have a mind without a brain, you are not suggesting a "supervening" mind, but a fully embodied one.
The "mind" is what the brain does; not a connected but separate entity?
Thank you for a very thoughtful reply, Hobbes.
In philosophy, supervenience is an ontological relation that is used to describe cases where (roughly speaking) the upper-level properties [in this case "mind"] of a system are determined by its lower level properties [in this case "brain"].
I see.
last time I heard the term was from a visiting shiny new type philosopher at the Lampeter Philosophy department of dusty old farts who did not like what he was saying, did not like the exposition claiming that he was disguising dualism by linguistic prestidigitation. The Stanford like explains it well enough
Cheers.
henry quirk wrote:Me: I'm thinkin' we best leave well enough alone before we unleash Skynet.
I agree. I consider myself a bit of a conservative with respect to technology. Sometimes I wonder if our scientists aren't on a mad dash to destroy us all in the name of figuring out whether or not they could conceivably do it. (Figuratively speaking)